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VICTIMLESS SEX CRIMES

privilege should exist. Routine accounting services are not intended as confidential and do not involve the seeking of legal advice. Yet those matters that
are intended to be confidential and do not involve the rendering of professional services should be protected.
Thus, while the recent extension of the Miranda warnings to tax investigations is commendable, the courts have generally condoned the Service's inquisitorial investigations and continued to deny the taxpayer constitutional
protections generally available in criminal investigations.
MulE ROLLYSON

VICTIMLESS SEX CRIMES: TO THE DEVIL, NOT
THE DUNGEON
[T]here is a sacred realm of privacy for every man ... where he makes
his choice and decisions, fashions his character and directs his desires,
a realm of his own essential rights and liberties, including, in the
providence of God, liberty to go to the devil, into which the law,
generally speaking, must not intrude.
-Archbishop of Canterbury'
During its 1973 session the Florida Legislature will consider an entirely
new criminal code presently being formulated by the House Committee on
Criminal Justice.2 "Crimes without victims" 3 are of crucial concern to the
drafters of the new criminal code.4 Following recent Florida5 and United
States Supreme Court decisions, 6 the legislature must carefully scrutinize the
present criminal statutes regulating acts of sexual conduct between consenting
adults.7 The purpose of this note is to examine the historical bases for laws
1. Archbishop of Canterbury quoted in E. CHssER, LiVE AND LET IAV
also GREAT BRrrAN HOME OFFicE CoMMrT

58 (1958). See

ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PRosnrTnTTON,

REPORT 61 (1957) [hereinafter cited as WOLFENDEN REPORT] (for a reprint of the full text
of the report together with a discussion and criticism see C. BERG & C. ALLEN, THE PROBLEm
oF HoMOsExuATY (1958)).
2. Interview with John F. Harkness, Legal Counsel to the Fla. House Comm. on Criminal
Justice, in Gainesville, Fla., Jan. 12, 1972. See also Letter from John F. Harkness to Morgan
S. Bragg, Jan. 18, 1972.
3. L. FurLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 44 (1969). Crimes such as sodomy, fornication, and
adultery between consenting adults; gambling; and prostitution are classified as "crimes
without victims" or "victimless crimes." Id.
4. Interview note 2 supra.
5. State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972) (held Florida's abortion statute,
FLA. STAT. §797.01 (1971), unconstitutional); Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971)
(held Florida's crime against nature statute, FLA. STAT. §800.01 (1971), void for vagueness).
6. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). A Massachusetts criminal statute prohibiting
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals was held to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 455.
7. E.g., FLA. STAT §§798.01 (adultery), .03 (fornication), 800.1 (crime against naturesodomy) (1971).
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criminalizing specified sexual acts, the controversy that presently surrounds the
area of victimless sex crimes, the liberalization of sex laws in other jurisdictions, and the social costs and constitutional questions created by morals
legislation. Finally, recommendations will be advanced for the modernization
of existing Florida sex laws in accordance with views of contemporary sociological, psychological, and legal authorities.
Recent publicity8 afforded Florida's abortion 9 and "crime against nature"' 10
statutes has focused the attention of the public and the courts on this state's
nineteenth century criminal statutes dealing with sexual conduct." In declaring both the abortion and sodomy statutes unconstitutional, 12 the Florida supreme court has served notice on the legislature that only criminal statutes drafted according to twentieth century standards will serve the needs of
13
a twentieth century society:
lJ]ustice should [not] be blind to the facts of life and of the times in
which it functions; for the law, to be vibrant, must be a living thing,
responsive to the society which it serves ....
[I]f today's world is to have brought home to it what it is that ...
statute[s] prohibit, it must be set forth in language which is relevant
to today's society ....
Recognizing that such reform is 14essentially a legislative function, the
court has urged the legislature to act:
Legislative action is long past due in this area and related fields of
personal relationships ... and with great restraint [we] have left to its
proper place in the Legislature the correction which is so sorely needed.
Florida's court is not unique in recognizing the need for reform. Within
the last fifteen years a number of states have enacted revised penal codes
with special consideration directed toward a liberalization of existing sex
laws.' 5 Moreover, the American Law Institute has recommended in the Model
Penal Code that criminal sanctions be removed from all forms of sexual conduct between consenting adults.'r

8. See, e.g., Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21
2d 857 (Fla. 1971).

9.

FLA. STAT.

(Fla. 1971); Walsingham v. State, 250 So.

§797.01 (1971).

10.

FLA. STAT. §800.01 (1971).

11.

FLA. STAT.

§798.01 (1971) (adultery) (enacted in 1874);

FLA. STAT.

§798.02 (1971)

(lewd and lascivious behavior) (enacted in 1868); FLA. STAT. §798.03 (1971) (fornication)
(enacted in 1868); FLA. STAT. §800.01 (1971) (crime against nature) (enacted in 1868).
12. State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972); Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d
21 (Fla. 1971).
13. Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21, 23 (Fla. 1971).
14. Id. at 24.
15. E.g., COLO. RFv. STAT. ch. 40 (Supp. 1971); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§53a-65 to -80
(1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §11 (Smith-Hurd 1964); N.Y. PENAL LAW art. 130 (McKinney
1967); ORE.REv. STAT. chs. 163, 167 (1971).
16. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE §207 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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Proposals like that of the American Law Institute, however, have met
with substantial and successful resistance from politically powerful religious
groups.17 Although sex is undoubtedly now discussed more openly than it was
in nineteenth century America,' 8 many legislators nevertheless fear that a vote
for repeal or liberalization of sex laws will be branded as a vote for im20
morality.- Unfortunately, even in the 1970's this fear is not unfounded.
Despite such fears, however, reform is essential.
ORIGINS OF CRIMINAL SANCTION

Definitions of criminal conduct are not based on unchanging standards
universally accepted by all cultures at all stages of development, 21 nor are
they so accepted within the confines of a single culture.22 Assuming that
definitions of criminal conduct universally operate within strict boundaries,
many commentators argue that law deals with crimes while morality deals
with sins.2 3 Although it might not be the duty of the law to deal with
morality,24 the law has never confined itself exclusively to activities that offend

against public order or expose a citizen to injury. Every law is in fact the
25
fruit of a decision about good and evil, right and wrong.
Since some concept of morality underlies all law, the distinction between
acts mala prohibita and acts mala in Se26 may become illusory. Acts once
classified because of Biblical influence, as mala in se, are now not considered
inherently immoral. Sunday closing laws illustrate this evolution. While
these laws were originally enacted to enforce religious proscriptions2 7 and thus
reflected the moral values of their drafters, they have developed a secular purpose bearing no relationship to the establishment of religion.28 Such secular
17.

See, e.g., Note, Deviate Sexual Behavior: The Desirability of Legislative Proscription,

30 ALBANY L. REv. 291, 293 (1966).
18. See, e.g., A. KINSEY, "WT.POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
MALE (1948); W. MAsrERS & V. JOHNSON, HUMAN SEXUAL RESPONSE (1965).
19. PloscoweThe Place of Law in Medico-Moral Problems: A Legal View (pt. 2), 31
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1238 (1956).
20. In response to one Florida state senator's unsuccessful attempt to exempt acts of
sodomy committed by consenting adults from criminal proscription, another state senator
stated: "It would mean putting the stamp of approval on something that's not moral and
not good." Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Feb. 17, 1972, §B at 8, col. 1.
21. Fox, What Is a Crime?, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 147, 153-55 (1963). See also Harris v.
State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alas. 1969). "Man is a creature of nature, yet he engages in conduct
which is approved in some cultures and disapproved in others.'" Id. at 645. See generally
Ford, Sex Offenses: An Anthropological Perspective, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 225 (1960).
22. Compare FLA. STAT. §800.01 (1969), with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §11-9 (Smith-Hurd
1964).
23. E.g., Sheedy, Law and Morals, 43 CH!. B. RFcoPn, 373 (1962).
24. See, e.g., WOL ENDEN REPORT, supra note 1, 257.
25. Fletcher, Sex Offenses: An Ethical View, 25 LAw & CoNrEMP. PROB. 244, 245 (1960).
26. Acts mala prohibita are criminal only because they are so defined by statute, while
acts mala in se embrace those acts that are immoral or wrong in themselves. Coleman v.
State ex rel. Carver, 119 Fla. 653, 654, 161 So. 89, 90 (1935).
27. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 446 (1961).
28. Id. at 444.
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purposes, however, are themselves based upon moral considerations. Legislatures have deemed it desirable to designate Sunday as a day of rest to provide
periodic cessation from labor.2 9 Decisions based upon moral considerations,
however, are not limited to the legislature. The judiciary is also likely to
0
apply moral standards in legal proceedings
Recognizing that criminal codes reflect moral standards, Professor Lon L.
31
Fuller envisions a moral scale on which all human activities are positioned.
Activities that society requires to be performed occupy the lower portion of
the scale and are defined as the "morality of duty." Only these activities are
subject to criminal sanctions. At the upper levels of the scale are all other
human activities that are free from legal sanctions. These comprise the "morality of aspiration" and are enforced solely by social sanctions. Separating
the two moralities is a fluctuating pointer that at any given time indicates
what activities are controlled by the force of law. Fuller envisions a continuous struggle between competing groups in our society to either increase or
or reduce the area of conduct subject to legal controls.
32
Florida statutes prohibiting certain sexual acts are based upon religious

laws traceable through Judeo-Christian history to Biblical origins. 3 While
these sexual acts were not considered criminal under English common law,
they were subject to sanctions imposed by ecclesiastical courts.34 Our society's
"morality of duty" includes sexual conduct between consenting adults. These
moral decisions are based upon Biblical laws, filtered through ecclesiastical
courts and the Puritan values of nineteenth century America. Thus, our
sex laws are not based on twentieth century developments in the sociological
and psychological sciences, but on a traditional code of ethics and morals
that is open to question and deserves careful investigation. s5
29. Id. at 436.
30. Cohen, Judicial Ethics, 12 OHIo ST. L.J. 3 (1961). "It is a pretty safe rule that
whenever a judge says, 'This is a court of law,' and then goes on to say that he cannot be
guided by moral or theological considerations, he is actually being guided by moral or
theological considerations without knowing it." Id. at 10.
31.

L.

FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW

9-13 (rev. 3d. 1969).

32. FLA. STAT. chs. 797 (prostitution), 798 (adultery and fornication), 800 (crime against
nature-sodomy) (1971).
33. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 648 (Alas. 1969). Leviticus 19:29, Deuteronomy
23:17 (prostitution); Exodus 20:14, Leviticus 18:20, 20:10 (adultery); 1 Corinthians 10:8
(fornication); Leviticus 18:22-23, 20:13, 15-16, Exodus 22:19 (sodomy). Compare FLA. STAT.
§800.01 (1971), with Leviticus 18:22.
34. Ploscowe, Sex Offenses: The American Legal Context, 25 LAW & CONTaMP. PROB.
217, 218 (1960). Fornication was punished as a common law offense only if committed openly
and notoriously as to constitute a nuisance. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. (5 Rand.)
627 (1826); 2 F. POLLOCK &F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 543 (reissued 2d ed.
1968). Adultery, however, was proscribed only by the church. Ex parte Rocha, 30 F.2d 823
(S.D. Tex. 1929); 2 F. POLLACK & F. MArTLAND supra. Oral genital contact was also not
contemplated by the common law. The original English sodomy statute of 1533 described
the prohibited acts only as "the detestable and abominable vice of buggery, committed
with mankind or beast." 25 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1533). This did not include oral copulation. Rex v.
Jacobs, 168 Eng. Rep. 830 (1817).
35. Ford, supra note 21, at 241.
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SUGGESTED LImTrrs TO LEGISLATIVE PROHIBITIONS

Religious laws should not become integral parts of our legal system unless
they serve independent secular purposes. 36 Having been properly urged by
7
the Florida supreme court to initiate long overdue reform in sex legislation,
the legislature must now decide what secular purposes are served by modem
sex laws and if the value of these laws justifies the legislation of sexual
morality.
Lord Patrick Devlin contends a shared morality is necessary to mold a
society from a collection of individuals.38 In his view any deviation from moral
norms threatens the existence of the society. Since the purpose of the law is
to protect society, all forms of morality must be enforced with the power
of law. 39 Therefore, Devlin contends criminal statutes proscribing private
acts of sexual immorality are properly subject to legal sanctions imposed by
society.40
Devlin's view that the law does not discharge its function to protect
society by merely protecting the individual from injury, corruption, and exploitation is not unchallenged. John Stuart Mill contemplated a more limited
41
role for the law:
The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over
any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral is not a suffident warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear
because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him
happier, because in the opinion of others to do so would be wise or
even right.
A more moderate approach is taken by Professor H. L. A. Hart who contends that although some shared morality is essential for the continued existence of society,4 2 laws governing sexual morality fall outside the scope of
43
any universally shared morality.
It appears that Lord Devlin's view has been applied in most American
jurisdictions. Courts have recognized that the legislature has the power, within
constitutional limitations, to denounce any act as criminal, fix the grade of
the offense, and establish the punishment for its commission.44 This police
power may be exercised in areas that "relate to the ... morals . . . of the

36. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961). See also text accompanying notes
142-151 infra.
37. See Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. 1971).
38.

P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MoRALS 8-22 (1965).

39. Id. at 13.
40. Id. at 8-22.
41. J. MILL, ON LIBEa" 73 (Everyman ed. 1859).
42.

H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MoRAixry 70 (1963).

43. Id. at 73.
44. Nation v. State, 154 Fla. 337, 17 So. 2d 521 (1944). See also United States v. Martell,
335 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1964); Perkins v. State, 234 F. Supp. 333, 337 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
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public." 5 Nevertheless, courts have consistently sought additional justifica-

46
tion for upholding statutes proscribing "victimless" criminal activity.
A common morality is, nonetheless, a powerful source of substantive law.
On many subjects there is widespread agreement concerning the propriety
of legal control over human behavior.47 It would be wrong, however, to accept
without question Devlin's philosophy that the morality of some groups is,
without more, entitled to legal enforcement. To accept this philosophy in the
area of sexual conduct between consenting adults would result in an adoption
4s
If
of laws premised on divine revelation not subject to rational analysis.
"so
far
as
possible
such laws are to be enforced on all of society they should
be those that human beings in the mass are able to comply with, without
excessive repression and frustration and without overmuch need for the
49
actual working of the legal machine."
The central issue in the current debate over statutory regulation of sexual
conduct seems not to be the age-old dialectic between natural law5o and positivism,51 but rather the question of enforcing the religious belief of some
upon all of society.5 2 Among the important events engendering this debate
was the 1955 proposal by the American Law Institute. The Institute's Model
Penal Code recommended that sexual practices should be statutorily proscribed only if they involve force, adult corruption of minors, or are com5 3
This debate increased in intensity with the 1957 suggesmitted in public.

45. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
46. See L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 596 (1900) (restricting prostitutes prevents vice from spreading); Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164, 165 (1900) (Blue Law
essential for physical wellbeing); Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488, 496 (1897) (lotteries
"plundered the ignorant and simple"); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66
(1878) ("polygamy leads to the patriarchial principal, and . . . so fetters the people in
stationary despotism"); State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 426, 11 A.2d 856, 862 (1940) (anticontraception statute promotes well-being of the family discouraging extra-marital relations
and promotes "a maintenance and increase of population"); State v. Brown, 236 La. 562, 563,
108 So. 2d 233, 234 (1959) (miscegenation causes "propagation of children who are burdened
•. .with a feeling of inferiority"). Significantly, the two last cited cases have been overruled
by subsequent cases reflecting the changing social norms. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
47.

E.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 782 (1971)

(homicide).

48. See Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 645-46 (Alas. 1969). See also text accompanying
notes 32-33 supra.
49. G. WLLIAMS, THE SANCIrrY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 232 (1957).
50. "The natural law concept found in many of the judicial authorities on this subject
implicitly refers to the idea of a settled rule, derivable by reason and cognizable to all
persons of common understanding." Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 645 (Alas. 1969); see note
21 supra and accompanying text. The question then arises: Which form of conduct
actually represents the pattern of nature? For a critical view of the natural law concept
see Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. RaV. 40 (1918).
51. Positivism is based on the theory that law is only what is "actually and specifically
enacted or adopted by proper authority for the government of an organized jural society."
BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 1324 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
52. Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 646 (Alas. 1969).
53. MODEL PENAL CODE §207.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). This recommen-
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tion of the Wolfenden Report concerning homosexual offenses and prostitution: 4
Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society, acting through
an agency of the law, to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin,
there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which
is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business.
Both Devlin and Hart agree that practices that lead to a breakdown of
external order may be statutorily proscribed. They differ, however, in deciding what practices may lead to this breakdown. 5 It has been suggested
that beneficial morals legislation "doses the door" to those activities that
threaten the continued existence of society. 56 Applying this maxim to legislation governing sexual conduct, two basic questions must be answered: (1)
whether legislation prevents commission of the prohibited acts and (2)
whether prohibition of these acts adds to social order.
Doctors Kinsey, Pomeroy, and Martin concluded that ninety-five per cent
of the American male population have committed some sexual act that
violates a criminal statute. 57 Eighty-five per cent have had premarital intercourse,5 8 seventy per cent have had relations with prostitutes,59 fifty-nine per
cent have had some experience in oral-genital contact,6 0 seventeen per cent
of those growing up on farms have experienced sexual intercourse with animals,61 and thirty to forty-five per cent of the married males have engaged in
extra-marital intercourse. 62 In a companion study published four years later,
this same team assisted by Dr. Gebhard concluded that twenty-eight per cent
of all American females and fifty per cent of all males have engaged in a

dation was based on the grounds, among others, that: "No harm to the secular interests of
the community is involved in atypical sex practices in private between consenting adult
partners. This area of private morals is the distinct concern of spiritual authorities." Id. at
277.
54. WOLTENDEN REPORT note 1 supra. It was, in fact, this report that initiated the
series of exchanges between Lord Devlin and Professor Hart. It should be noted that
Devlin's position that the state should enforce Judeo-Christian morality, based on divine
revelation, has lost ground even in Great Britain, which has an established church. The
Anglican Church itself came out for abolition of criminal prohibitions on homosexual
behavior between consenting adults. Note, The Crimes Against Nature, 16 J. PUn. L. 159,
187 n.148 (1967).
55. The Devlin-Hart conflict can be better understood by examining Bodenheimer,
The Case Against Natural Law Reassessed, 17 STAN. L. REv. 39 (1964); Devlin, Mill on
Liberty in Morals, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 215 (1965); Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YAE LEJ. 986 (1966); Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of
Morality, 35 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 1 (1967).
56. Sheedy, supra note 23, at 375.
57. A. KISEY, W. POMROY 8- C. MMTxN, supranote 18, at 392.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1972

7

FloridaOF
Law
Review, LAW
Vol. 25,
Iss. 1 [1972], Art. 5[Vol. XXV
FLORIDA
REVIEW
UNIVERSITY
6
homosexual act at least once in their lives. " These figures indicate that
existing statutory proscriptions of sexual activity do not reflect any "shared
morality" of our society. Nor do ostensible criminal sanctions appear to discourage many persons from participating in these activities.
Kinsey's figures, however, have not been immune from criticism. Perhaps
the most valid complaint is that they are based on the erroneous presumption
that all states proscribe the same acts. 64 Allowing for jurisdictional variations,
however, it is still evident that a significant percentage of the population engages in unlawful sexual conduct. 65
It is equally apparent that few violators are ever charged or convicted.
One study estimated that less than one per cent of all male violators are
ever charged with a crime, with still fewer convicted. 66 The reasons for this
seem clear. The ordinary act of fornication, adultery, or deviant homosexual
or heterosexual behavior is conducted in private without a victim to make
a complaint.67 Thus, existing criminal statutes clearly fail to prevent the
commission of these prohibited acts.
Despite Kinsey's evidence, however, some commentators claim that a legalization of illicit sexual conduct would imply social approval of the acts and
foster their spread.6s Empirical evidence does not support this view. The
repeal of laws penalizing consensual acts in Sweden 69 and other European
countries7o has produced no noticeable increase in such conduct. In addition,
it is arguable that community, religious, and family disapproval effectively
discourage such conduct. The effects of such social pressures would not be
weakened by a removal of criminal sanctions71 especially if repeal were ac-

63. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN & P. GnIAlRD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR OF THE HUMAN
FEMALE 474 (1953).
64. M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 130 (rev. ed. 1962). This was clearly not the case
in 1948 nor is it today. Bensing, A Comparative Study of American Sex Statutes, 42 J.
C~am. L.C. &. P.C. 57 (1951); see text accompanying notes 83-109 infra. Another common
criticism is that Kinsey selected his subjects from a limited geographical area. This restricted sample combined with earlier studies demonstrating a geographical variation in
in attitudes toward sex allegedly caused inaccuracies in the final totals. It is suggested that
modern communications, transportation, and resulting population mobility have sufficiently
destroyed sectional diversity to minimize resulting differences in attitudes. See Ploscowe,
Sex Offenses: The American Legal Context, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 217, 221 (1960).
65. Note, Post-Kinsey: Voluntary Sex Relations as Criminal Offenses, 17 U. Cm. L REv.
162, 169-70 (1949).
66. Bowman & Engle, A Psychiatric Evaluation of Laws of Homosexuality, 29 TEMP. L.Q.
273, 307 (1956). Another study estimated that 6 million acts of sodomy, fellatio, and mutual
masturbation take place each year for every 20 convictions obtained. M. PLOSCOWE, supra
note 64, at 209.
67. Ploscowe, Sex Offenses: The American Legal Context, 25 LAW & CONTMP. PRI.
217, 221 (1960).
68. E.g., P. DEVLIN, supra note 38, at 18-19.
69. See WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note I, f59.
70. See Sturup, Sex Offenses: The Scandinavian Experience, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
361 (1960).
71. See Ephraim v. State, 82 FIa, 93, 95, 89 So. 344, 345 (1921); Bowman & Engle, supra
note 66, at 304.
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companied by a legislative disclaimer of approval.7 2
Despite the Kinsey studies the vast majority of persons view illicit sex
as morally wrong.73 Thus, in support of sex laws many claim that the criminal law should correspond to these "behavioral ideals" and enforce the
moral judgments of the community7 4 The question remains whether the
75
criminal law is the correct vehicle for such moral education. Attempts to
enforce a community's publicly expressed sexual standards on every individual
may foster rebellion76 or create the impression that "the individual's part is
limited to the evasion of detection."77 Society and the law should place their
emphasis on the individual's freedom of choice in matters of private morality;
to do so is "to emphasize the personal and private responsibility of the indi8
vidual for his own actions."7
Existing sex laws do not deter violators, nor would their relaxation lead
to a destruction of public order. Hence, narrower limits to legislative proscriptions should be examined lest lawyers, legislators, and judges be accused
of imposing their own standards of sexual behavior on the balance of the
community.79 Narrower limits have been suggested,80 but legislators have been
reluctant to act.81
Sex legislation should reflect the state's interest in protecting the individual from forcible attack; protecting the young, immature, and incompetent from the sexual advances of the more mature who seek to prey on
their victim's youth, ignorance, or incompetence; and the protection of the
public in general from conduct that disturbs the peace or openly flouts ac-

72. If such acts are made lawful, the law can still withhold certain benefits. Sheedy,
Law and Morals, 43 Ci. B. REcoR 373, 376 (1962); see Inman v. City of Miami, 197 So. 2d
50 (3d D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 895 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968)
(upheld city ordinance prohibiting liquor licensees from knowingly employing or serving
homosexual persons); Raider v. The Dixie Inn, 198 Ky. 152, 248 S.W. 229 (1923) (requirement that innkeeper admit all travelers held not applicable to prostitutes); Upfill v. Wright,
1 K.B. 506 (1911) (landlord who lets flat for fornication or adultery may not recover his

rent).
73. See, e.g., Note, supra note 65, at 175-76.
74. Ludwig, Control of the Sex Criminal, 25 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 203, 209 (1951); Schwartz,
Book Review, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 914, 915 (1948).
75. Id. But see P. DEVIz.N, supra note 38, at 8.
76. Katz, Christ and Law, 12 OKLA. L. REv. 57, 64 (1959).
77. Puxon, Not as Other Men, 101 SoL. J. 735 (1957), quoted in Note, Private Consensual
Homosexual Behavior: The Crime and Its Enforcement, 70 YAL.E L.J. 623, 626-27 (1961).
78. WOLFENDEN REPORT note 1 supra.
79. Blum 9: Kalven, The Art of Opinion Research: A Lawyers Appraisal of an
Emerging Science, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 5-12 (1956); see Repoville v. United States, 165
F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947); A. KiNSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
HUMAN MALE at 389-93 (1948).
80. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §207 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Fletcher, Sex Offenses:
An Ethical View, 25 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 244, 257 (1960); Ploscowe, Report to The
Hague: Suggested Revisions of Penal Law Relating to Sex Crimes and Crimes Against the
Family, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 425 (1965).
81. See Gainesville (Fla.) Sun., Feb. 17, 1972, §B at 8, col. 1; Note, Deviate Sexual
Behavior: The Desirability of Legislative Proscription, 30 ALBANY L. REy. 291, 293 (1966).
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cepted standards of morality in the communitys 2 Laws prohibiting all sexual
activity between consenting adults except that performed on the conjugal
bed appear unnecessarily broad to accomplish these three objectives. A comparison of Florida's sodomy, adultery, and fornication statutes with those of
other jurisdictions that have initiated reform in accordance with the three
suggested limits will reveal whether additional protections are needed.
FLORIDA SEX STATUTES: SUCCESSFUL LIBERALIZATION POSSIBLE?

Proposed and existing Florida sex lawss * clearly fulfill the three suggested
legislative purposes. However, they appear deficient in their overbreadth and
unnecessary repetition of prohibitions outlined in other statutes.
In response to judicial suggestion, s4 the Florida Legislature drafted a new
definition of sodomy setting forth with sufficient particularity the nature of
all prohibited acts.8 5 The proposed definition is in accord with those of other
jurisdictions that have recently enacted liberalized sex laws. s 6 In assigning
criminal penalties to these acts, however, the Florida proposal prohibits all

82. Authorities cited note 80 supra. See generally WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 1,
Williams, Sex Offenses: The British Experience, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 334-60 (1960).
83. FLA. STAT. §§794.01, .05-.06, 798.01, .03, 800.02-.03, 801.011-.251 (1971). In December
1971 the Florida supreme court declared the state's "crime against nature" statute, FLA.
STAT. §800.01 (1971) void for vagueness. Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971). Identical
proposals for a new sodomy statute were prefiled in both the Florida Senate and House of
Representatives. Fla. S. 289 (1972); Fla. H. 2879 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSAL].
Neither bill was enacted into law. Hence, the common law crime of sodomy is presently
in effect. FLA. STAT. §775.01 (1971); see text accompanying note 34 supra. Yet in holding
the crime against nature statute unconstitutional the supreme court noted: "[P]ending
further legislation in the matter, society will continue to be protected from this sort of
reprehensible act under Section 800.02, Florida Statutes . . . which provide: 'Unnatural and
lascivious act.-Whoever commits any unnatural and lascivious act with another person shall
be punished by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
six months.' " Arguably, this statute is itself as vague as the one the court envisions it
temporarily replaces. In view of the court's statement, however, should there be a prosecution for oral-genital relations, an offense unknown to the common law, it would probably
result in a conviction under this statute. Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. 1971).
84. See Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971). See also text accompanying notes
12-14 supra.
85. PROPOSAL note 83 supra. "Sodomy" is defined as "carnally knowing any person by
the anus or by or with the mouth." Id. §1 (1). Anticipating that the revised criminal code
will include a similar, if not identical, statute the definition and penalty provisions of
this proposal will be discussed in this section.
86. Illinois uses the term "deviate sexual conduct" to define "any act of sexual gratification involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another." ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §11-2 (Smith-Hurd 1964). In Connecticut the term employed is "deviate
sexual intercourse" and is defined as "(a) sexual contact between persons not married to
each other consisting of contact between the penis and the anus, the mouth and the penis,
or the mouth and the vulva, or (b) any form of sexual conduct with an animal or dead
body." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §53a-65 (2) (1971). Oregon and Colorado use similar definitions.

1172;
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except conjugal acts.8 7 Individuals are protected from forcible assault;8s
youth and incompetents are protected;89 and with consensual acts between
adults prohibited, the public is certainly protected from any offensive
conduct. 90 In addition, however, minors under the age of fourteen are
protected by the Child Molester Act, 91 as is the public under existing indecent exposure statutes. 92
Statutory duplication to protect the public interest by prohibiting consensual conduct succeeds only in protecting the psyche of those who might
be offended by knowing that such conduct was legal. Both the Illinois and
Connecticut Legislatures felt such expansive protection was unnecessary. In
both states consensual acts performed in private between adults are not prohibited by statute.9 3 These statutes have apparently accepted the recommendations of the Model Penal Code.94 The Illinois experience is especially
significant for its code has now been in effect for more than ten years 95 and
the liberal provisions have apparently engendered no public outcry for a
return to the absolute proscriptions of the earlier statute.
The New York Legislature attempted to reform its sodomy statute, following an approach similar to that of Illinois.96 Resulting political pressure,
however, forced the passage of a compromise statute, 97 similar to the Florida
proposal, describing adult consensual sodomy as a class B misdemeanor
punishable by a term not to exceed three months. 98 This compromise prompted Professor Ploscowe to comment that the enacted legislation was "unquestionably ... an ineffective moral gesture on the part of the legislature,
which should have had more sophistication and sense."9 9 Hence, if Florida
seeks a model, the Illinois statute appears to offer the most enlightened approach.
87. PROPOSAL, supra note 83, §§1 (4)- (5).

88. PROPOSAL, supra note 83, §1 (2) (aggravated sodomy).
89. PROPOSAL, supra note 83, §§1 (2)- (3)(mental incompetents and those misled, drunk,
or drugged); Id. §1 (4) (a) (youth under 14); Id. §1 (4) (b) (youth under 18).
90. PROPOSAL, supra note 83, §1 5).
91. FLA. STAT. §§801.011-.251 (1971). While this duplication of protection is not seriously
criticized, it is pointed out to illustrate the legislature's effort to insure that all acts of

sodomy are definitely described and prohibited.
92. See FA. STAT. §800.02-.03 (1971).
93. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §58a-67 (1971) (consent an affirmative defense); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§11-3 to -6 (Smith-Hurd 1964) (prohibited act must be committed by

force or with a youth under the age of 18). See also COLO. Rav.

STAT.

§§40-3-403 to -412

(Supp. 1971); ORr. RE V. STAT. §§163.885-.455 (1971).
94. See MODEL PENAL CODE §207 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
95. The Illinois Criminal Code became effective Jan. 1, 1962. See C. SowrL,
EXPLANATION OF THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961

A

CONCISE

II (1961).

96. The proposed draft of the revised New York Penal Code eliminated the offense
L. REav. 1469,

of consensual sodomy. Note, The Proposed Penal Law of New York, 64 COLUm.

1545 (1964).
97. The Catholic Welfare Committee, an unofficial voice of the Roman Catholic Church,
had perhaps the most influence in the rejection of this legislative proposal. Note, supra note
81, at 293.
98. N.Y. PENAL LAW §130.38 (McKinney 1967).
99. Ploscowe, Sex Offenses in the New Penal Code, 32 BROoK. L. REv. 274, 284 (1966).
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Florida's fornication statute'0 0 is not specifically concerned with protecting
individuals or the public from forcible sexual attack or with protecting
02
°1
youth. Such protection is afforded by existing rape and indecent exposure
statutes and the Child Molester Act.'0 3 Recognizing that fornication statutes
offer no additional protection, at least seventeen states have no such prohibitions.f0 4
05
Similarly, at least four states do not assign criminal penalties to adultery.
Illinois retained its adultery statute in an effort to protect the institution of
the family. 06 The question remains, however, whether the threat of criminal
sanctions actually discourages adulterous conduct and protects the family
07
unit. Florida's existing statute punishes only open and notorious adultery,
08
not isolated indiscretions of one spouse. It would appear that if one spouse
is living in open and notorious adultery the family unit is already hopelessly
broken. Thus, the statutory proscription of such activity seems not to serve
its avowed social purpose.
If legislative proscriptions are deemed necessary, a scheme based on the
Arizona adultery statute' 0 9 seems most reasonable. Arizona requires the
adulterer's spouse to file a written complaint before prosecution will be
initiated. Additionally, the adulterer and his spouse must be cohabitating as
man and wife. Such a requirement would limit the scope of the adultery law
to situations where a family unit in fact exists.
At least four states do not impose criminal sanctions on adulterous conduct, seventeen do not proscribe fornication and four impose no penalty for
consensual sodomy. While these states obviously reflect a minority view, they
do agree with what many believe to be realistic standards for today's society.
Moreover, their experience indicates that liberalization is workably possible.
SOCIAL COSTS OF ExISTING LEGISLATION

Since the only legal sex activity outside of marriage is an act of private
masturbation, existing Florida sex laws make potential criminals of most of
°
the state's adolescent and adult population.11 Should these laws be rigidly
enforced, courts and penal institutions would be unable to handle the
100.

FLA. STAT.

§798.02 (1971).

I01. FLA. STAT. §§794.01 (forcible rape), 794.05 (rape of unmarried person under
eighteen years of age), §794.06 (rape of unmarried female idiot) (1971).
102. FLA. STAT. §800.02-.03 (1971).
103. FLA. STAT. §801.041 (1971).
104. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont,
and Washington.
105. Louisiana, New Mexico, Oregon, and Tennessee.
106. See C. SowLE, supra note 95, at 15-16. See also Wexler, Sex Offenses Under the
New Criminal Code 51 ILL. B.J. 152-54 (1962).
107. FLA. STAT. §798.01 (1971).
108. Braswell v. State, 88 Fla. 183, 101 So. 232 (1924); Grice v. State, 75 Fla. 751, 78
So. 984 (1918); Brevaldo v. State, 21 Fla. 789 (1886).
109. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-221 (1966).
110. See text accompanying notes 57-63 supra.
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number of violators. Law enforcement officials admit they are applied only to
1
acts that involve minors, unwilling victims, or are performed in public.
The failure of the state to prosecute, however, does not justify the existence of
the statutes. So long as these statutes remain available to the state "the threat
of prosecution ... is a real and substantial one."'1 2
4
If sex laws are not enforced"' or if such laws are unenforceable" they
should be repealed. Judge Learned Hand stated that a law not enforced is
worse than no law at all." 5 Lack of enforcement of many such laws may be responsible at least in part for a general loss of respect for all law.",, An individual charged with a consensual sexual violation is unlikely to respect the
law that treats him with severity while the majority of the population goes unpunished for similarly prohibited acts.
Perhaps more serious than the problem of nonenforcement is that of discriminatory enforcement. In a recent ten-year period the only three cases
of female homosexual sodomy in New York City were dismissed while "tens of
7
thousands" of male defendants were arrested and convicted." If such a discrepancy were found in convictions of different races, the defense of discrimination might be successfully asserted. This obvious social injustice may
well reinforce existing hostility toward the law.
Dead letter laws dealing with adultery and fornication are likewise subject to discriminatory enforcement. They have been used to prosecute part9
ners of different races,:"' and to publicly embarass political opponents."1 In
fact, the American Law Institute reports that prosecutions rarely occur except

111.

See, e.g., Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729, 733 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated,

401 U.S. 989 (1971). This allegation was made when the defendant chief of police questioned
whether a married couple had standing to seek an injunction for the enforcement of a
Texas statute that prohibited acts of sodomy even between married couples.
112. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965). The constitutional questions posed
by existing statutes governing consensual sexual conduct is discussed infra. Explaining
the social costs of these statutes necessitates reference to cases that were decided on constitutional grounds.
113. See Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729, 733 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated, 401
U.S. 989 (1971).
114. See, e.g., M. PLOSCOWE, SEx AND ns LAw 195 (rev. ed. 1962).
115. Note, supra note 81, at 297 (statement before the American Law Institute May 19,
1955). At this American Law Institute meeting article 207 of the Model Penal Code, which
recommended repeal of all criminal sanctions of proscribed consensual sexual activity between adults, was adopted. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE §207 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
116. "If the criminal law is to become or remain a respected tool in the maintenance of
social order, its retention in a particular instance can only be justified by its reasonable
correlation to the subsumed social facts." Note, Post-Kinsey: Voluntary Sex Relations as

Criminal Offenses, 17 U. Cm. L. REv. 162, 182 (1949).
117. Bowman & Engle, A Psychiatric Evaluation of Laws of Homosexuality, 29 TEMP.
L.Q. 273, 281 (1956). It was also pointed out by these authors that sex laws were more
strictly enforced against homosexuals than against heterosexuals. Id. at 279.
App. 409, 49
118. See, e.g., Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57 (1877); People v. Potter, 319 Ill.
N.E.2d 307 (1943); State v. Fore, 23 N.C. 378 (1841).
119. See, e.g., People v. Bright, 77 Colo. 563, 238 P. 71 (1925).
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in blackmail situations. 12 0 Criminal complaints of adultery, for example, are
generally filed as a lever to secure favorable divorce settlements, but almost
always abandoned once the divorce is obtained. 12 1 Despite the recent enactment of Florida's "no-fault" divorce statute, 12 2 the complaint procedure might
still be effective in obtaining a more favorable settlement. To avoid the un12 3
favorable publicity resulting from being charged with adulterous conduct,
one spouse is likely to be more agreeable to the other's demands.
Perhaps more disturbing than the use of sex laws by private individuals
for personal gain are the instances of such abuse by law enforcement officials.
In Massachusetts a local district attorney was convicted of extorting 100,000
dollars from wealthy movie magnates by threatening to indict them on charges
of patronizing a house of prostitution.124 Similar tactics were used in another
50,000 dollar extortion attempt for a stay of prosecution for adultery. 1"5 Such
abuses also extend to sodomy prosecutions. In Kelly v. United States"0 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed a conviction
noting: 127
[A]n accusation of a verbal invitation to sodomy is as terrifying as a
threat of accusation of sodomy itself; perhaps more so because even
less susceptible of defense ....
Any citizen who answers a stranger's inquiry as to direction ... or
... a match is liable to be threatened with an accusation of this sort.
There is virtually no protection ....
It follows that threatened accusation of this offense is the easiest
of blackmail methods . . . [which] may impel [one] to comply with
a demand for money under such a threat.
While the removal of existing criminal sanctions against consensual sexual
activity might not prevent such blackmail or extortion attempts, it would
preclude the state from being the blackmailer's "silent partner" and its laws
from being tools of the trade.
Apart from blackmail and extortion, sex laws appear to encourage police
to engage in illegal enforcement techniques such as entrapment and invasion
of privacy.12 8 While the fourth amendment expressly prohibits unreasonable

See MODEL PENAL CODE §207.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
121. Id.
122. FLA. STAT. §§61.001-.191 (1971). Concerning enforcement of adultery laws, it is
120.

interesting to note that until 1967 the only ground for divorce in New York was adultery.
Thousands of people received divorces each year, yet since 1900 there has been no one
convicted of the crime. Ploscowe, supra note 99, at 283. See also Note, supra 96, at 1539
n.489.
123. See Note supra note 96, at 1539.
124. Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 501-07, 511-16, 132 N.E. 322, 331-34,
336-38 (1921).
125. Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 280-82, 134 N.E. 47, 427-29 (1922).
126. 194 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
127. Id. at 153-54.
128. While the adultery statute requires open and notorious conduct, both the sodomy
proposal and fornication statutes punish single acts, regardless of whether such openness
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searches,"20 this provision is not violated when informers or false friends

are employed to acquire incriminating evidence. 30 Yet to induce a suspect to
commit a crime should bar prosecution under the doctrine of entrapment.' 3'
The defense of entrapment is not available to persistent violators who are
predisposed to committing the criminal act.132 This test, however, was developed in cases involving violent crimes, 3 3 and appears unsuitable for application to victimless sex offenses. 2 4 While enforcement of these sex laws
may prove to be impossible without the employment of entrapment techniques, 13 any social gain realized in a particular instance appears to be outweighed by the generally disreputable tactics police are encouraged to use
and the court time wasted in determining if illegal enforcement procedures
have been utilized. 36
Disregarding the religious and moral convictions of individuals, which
seem to lead to emotional controversy over the utility of sex laws, legislative
and notoriety are present. FLA. STAT. §§798.01 (adultery), 798.03 (fornication) (1971). This
sexual conduct is ordinarily conducted in private. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
Thus, to enforce these laws police are required to use illegal procedures. Such procedures,
however, seem to be used more often in cases involving homosexual rather than in heterosexual conduct. See, e.g., Kelly v. United States, 194 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Bieliki v.
Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962); Rittenour v. District
of Columbia, 163 A.2d 558 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1960).
129.

U. S. CONST. amend. IV.

130. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (fourth amendment was not
violated when suspect's friend, wired for sound, entered his store and engaged him in
incriminating conversation).
131. See, e.g., Rittenour v. District of Columbia, 163 A.2d 558 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1960).
This doctrine is intended to prevent inducement into crime and further to prevent law
enforcement officials from employing methods that cannot be countenanced. Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378-85 (1958) (concurring opinion); Sorrels v. United States,
287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932). "Surely if the law has its seamy side it is to be found in the
area [of victimless sex crimes] where the methods of enforcement become almost as sordid
as the activities they are intended to suppress." L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 44

(1969). For examples of such sordid methods see Bieliki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602,
371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962); Rittenour v. District of Columbia, 163 A 2d 558
(D.C. Mun. CL App. 1960).
132. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
133. E.g., People v. Molone, 117 Cal. App. 629, 4 P.2d 287 (1931) (burglary); People
v. Lanzit, 70 Cal. App. 498, 223 P. 816 (1925) (attempt to commit murder).
134. In dealing with homosexual offenders in particular, some courts have recognized
how easily police may "torment and tease weak men beyond their power to resist." Guarro
v. United States, 237 F.2d 578, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1956); McDermett v. United States, 98 A.2d
287, 290 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1953).
135. See Kelly v. United States, 194 F.2d 150, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Seitner v. United
States, 143 A.2d 101 (D.C. Mun. CL App.), aff'd per curiam, 262 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
136. See Kelly v. United States, 194 F.2d 150, 152-54 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Police have used
various techniques to encourage individuals to violate these laws, which if known to the
general public, would arguably be offensive to normal sensitivities. Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932) (appeal based on sentiment as old army buddies); United States v.
Washington, 20 F.2d 160 (D. Neb. 1927) (pity); Silk v. United States, 16 F.2d 568, 569
(8th Ci. 1926) (appeal based on friendship between police officer and defendant); United
States v. Wray, 8 F.2d 429, 430 (N.D. Ga. 1925) (sympathy). See also L. FULLR note 131
supra.
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attention should be focused on elements that may produce rational debate and
agreement. 137 Difficulty or impossibility of enforcement reduces or eliminates
any possible deterrent effect. Arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement may
well breed contempt for all laws; police corruption is encouraged; private
blackmail schemes are aided with the force of law; and we demean our police
by asking them to be decoys.1 38 Moreover, our law enforcement agencies, prosecution resources, and courts are wastefully diverted from the central insecurities of our modern society - rape, robbery, burglary, and assault.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF VICIM1LESS SEX LAWS

Supporters of morals legislation urge that the state has the constitutional
power to impose laws and the exercise of this power in the area of sexual
morality has consistently been upheld by the courts.139 Proponents of liberalizing sex laws have, nonetheless attacked the constitutionality of existing
statutes 40 on one or more of four theories: (1) the statutes are unconstitutionally vague in failing to define the prohibited acts with sufficient specificity and
in language understandable to the average citizen; (2) they violate the first
amendment of the United States Constitution by enforcing what amount to
solely religious laws; (3) the statutes themselves constitute a denial of equal
protection; and (4) they infringe upon the individual's right to privacy. The
first constitutional objection can be easily remedied by legislative "repair" to
suspect laws. 14 1 Because this remedy is so easily administered without reaching

the more substantive constitutional questions, it cannot be seriously considered an effective weapon in attacking the basic problems of sex legislation.
Enforcement of Religious Laws
Laws prohibiting sexual activity between unmarried couples stem from
Biblical proscriptions . 2 The United States Constitution provides that a
state may not establish religion or interfere with the free exercise of religion.'4 3
It is therefore arguable that a state may not enforce sex laws based on religious
proscriptions for to do so would be inconsistent with the doctrine of separation
of church and state.
137. Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 CoLum. L. Rav. 669 (1963).
138. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). "[I]t is well settled that decoys may be
used to entrap criminals and to present opportunity to one intending or willing to commit
crime." Id. at 445. But see Rittenour v. District of Columbia, 163 A.2d 558 (D.C. Mun. CL
App. 1960).
139. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-66 (1879). See also text accompanying note 47
supra.
140. Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
391 (1963).
141. Following the decision in Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971), which declared Fla. Stat. §800.01 (1971) void for vagueness, the Florida Legislature proposed a new
sodomy statute curing this constitutional infirmity. PROPOSAL note 83 supra.
142. E.g., Exodus 20:14 (adultery).
143. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Justice Harlan claimed that morals laws are a present reality regardless of
their source, and that they traditionally enjoy constitutional immunity: 44
Yet the very inclusion of the category of morality among state concerns
indicates that society is not limited in its objects only to the physical
well-being of the community, but has traditionally concerned itself
with the moral soundness of its people as well. . . . The laws regulating marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be
used and the legal and societal context in which children are born
and brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and
homosexual practices . . . form a pattern so deeply pressed into the
substance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this
area must build upon that basis.
A majority of the Supreme Court, however, has made it clear that history
alone is not sufficient authority to uphold laws enforcing religious beliefs.
Although the religious prohibitions of the first amendment have only recently been held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, 45 their application is not limited to new laws but extends to those laws
predating the Constitution. 14 6 In a careful reexamination of Sunday Blue
Laws, 47 the Court noted that they were originally designed to promote religious observance and reflected the community attitude that working on
the Sabbath was immoral.48 While the Court upheld these laws, it did so
despite their history, rather than because of it, implying strongly that laws
serving solely religious functions would be forbidden.'- 9 In assessing the
validity of morals legislation, courts have consistently sought to support their
decisions with secular purposes served by these statutes.150 While such justification can be easily found for homicide, theft, and usury, the secular purposes
served by prohibitions of sexual conduct between consenting adults are less
obvious. Lord Devlin's argument that any immorality threatens society's cohesion appears the most convincing, but the experience of those states with
liberalized sex laws reveals no threatened disintegration of society.
The effect, if not the primary purpose of the establishment of religion
clause is to bar governmental interference in a realm of personal activities
that is of no concern to others. Religiously-based legislation cannot be justified by its historical base alone: 15'
144. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
145. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The doctrine of separation
of church and state has long been recognized. Everson v. Board of Educ., 303 U.S. 1, 16
(1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). The doctrine has only been
recently applied, however. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see Henkin, supra note
140, at 408 nn.51-52.
146. See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
147. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
148. Id. at 445.
149. Id.; see Henkin, supra note 140, at 408.
150. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
151. Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 644-45 (Alas. 1969).
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With the expansion of the concept of individual freedom in our
society, as exemplified in... the trends of our constitutional law, there
has been a corresponding decrease of religious beliefs as determinants of
social and legal principles. The emphasis today is on religious freedom,
not on a tyranny of religious ideas over persons to whom they are unacceptable. Coupled with this there has been the acquisition of . . .
vast . . . scientific, statistical, and psychological data about the sexual

nature and behavior of man. [As a result a] re-examination of our entire
regulation of sexual behavior by the criminal law may well be in order.
Equal Protection and the Right of Privacy

52

In Griswold v. Connecticut15 3 the United States Supreme Court invalidated
a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives as violative of certain
"penumbras" of marital privacy created by the first, third, fourth, fifth, and
ninth amendments.154 Carefully limiting the scope of Griswold to marital
privacy, the Court granted this newly protected group the right to engage in
parochial acts of sexual intercourse without fear of conceiving unwanted
children. Arguably, all private consensual sexual conduct of married couples,
56
155
Posthaving no visible impact on others, would similarly be protected.
Griswold interpretations of sodomy statutes appear to support this position.
In Cotner v. Henry' 57 the court observed that sodomy statutes that punish
acts of married couples might well be unconstitutional after Griswold.- s
In Buchanan v. Batchelor a Texas sodomy statute' 5 9 was successfully attacked by a married couple on the ground that it violated their right of
marital privacy. 60 The couple intervened in a suit brought by a confessed
152. The constitutional questions of equal protection and the right of privacy may
logically be considered together. It was the right of privacy that extended sexual freedom
to married couples. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). This freedom was
recently expanded to include unmarried individuals on equal protection grounds. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
153. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
154. Id. at 483-84. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan reiterated his argument of
the impossibility of drawing a line between public behavior and private conduct. Id. at
500-02. See text accompanying note 149 supra.
155. See Chesebrough v. State, 255 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1971) (mother convicted of violating
(lewd and lascivious act in the presence of a minor under age
FLA. STAT. §800.04 (1971)
fourteen) for engaging in sexual intercourse with her husband (son's step-father) in the
presence of her minor son in order to demonstrate to him how babies are made).
156. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
157. 394 F..2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968) (habeus corpus
proceeding).
158. Id. at 875. "The import of the Griswold decision is that private, consensual,
marital relations are protected from regulations by the state through the use of a criminal
penalty." Id. See also Travers v. Patton, 261 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1966) where the
court also observed that Griswold protects "the sanctity of sexual aspects of the marital
relationship." Id. at 113.
159. Tax. PEN. CODE art. 524 (1970).
160. Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729, 732-33, 735-36 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated,
401 U.S. 989 (1971). The Supreme Court vacated the district court decision as a violation
of the policy against a federal court staying or enjoining prosecution under a state statute
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homosexual for a declaratory judgment on the statute's constitutionality,
claiming the plaintiff did not adequately protect the interests of married
persons.1 6' Relying on Griswold the court held the statute unconstitutional
insofar as it reached the private, consensual acts of married couples. 6 2 However, since the court felt Griswold applied only to married couples, single
individuals were not similarly protected. 163
Without more, therefore, the Griswold decision was apparently inapplicable to any state policy against premarital or extramarital sexual conduct, this being "concededly a permissible and legitimate legislative goal."'16
Florida's proposed sodomy statute exempting married couples from sodomy
prohibitions 6 5 accords with this limited interpretation of Griswold.
On March 22, 1972, however, a plurality of the Supreme Court announced
a startling expansion of Griswold rights in matters pertaining to the sexual
conduct of single individuals. In Eisenstadt v. Baird6 6 the Court held unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute prohibiting distribution of birth control
devices to single persons.'16 Viewing the statute as a prohibition on contraception per se, the Court held it violated the rights of single persons under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 6 Noting that Griswold concerned only marital privacy, the Court continued:69
Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional make-up. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.
Concededly, the holding in Eisenstadt is limited to the distribution of
contraceptives to single persons. Perhaps because the case dealt only with
that issue, the Court, for argument's sake, conceded that a state could fashion
appropriate remedies for fornication.17 A fornication statute was not at
issue, however. The Court's concession was made only to reinforce its position that the statute, by its very terms, could not be interpreted as a measure
to deter premarital or extra-marital sex.' 7 ' Such dictum does not support the

pending
Younger
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

state court proceedings except under special circumstances, 401 U.S. 989, citing
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729, 730 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
Id. at 735.
Id.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 505 (1965) (White, J., concurring).
PROPOSAL note 83 supra.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Id. at 455.
Id.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 448.

171. Id.
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contention that fornication statutes are constitutional. Once the right to own
a harmless item of personalty172 is granted to an individual, he is also granted
the right to use this personalty for the purpose for which it is intended.171
Hence, single adults must have the right to engage in sexual intercourse.
There is admitted difficulty in applying this same reasoning to the crime
of adultery. In impinging upon fundamental freedoms, the state may make
classifications that are necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. 74 The
preservation of the family relationship might be such a compelling state
interest.'1' The state, however, may not "broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."'

76

Certainly if

there is no meaningful marital or family relationship to be preserved, there
is no compelling state interest. 77 The broad proscription of all open and
notorious adulterous conduct therefore appears to violate the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 78 A statute that allowed only a spouse
to file a complaint against the adulterous partner and further provided that
this complaint could only be filed if the couple were still living together as
husband and wife would be narrow in scope and yet arguably protect any
legitimate compelling state interest.
Following Eisenstadt, sodomy statutes may well be held unconstitutional
on equal protection grounds. Based on Griswold these statutes have in the
past been held unconstitutional when applied to married couples. 79 With
the expansion of Griswold rights to single persons, 80 the constitutional supports for the distinction between married and single persons collapse.' 8 ' To
hold otherwise would arguably be a denial of equal protection in violation
82
of the fourteenth amendment:

172. The Eisenstadt court noted with approval the First Circuit Court's comment that
most birth control devices are not of such demonstrated danger as to require a medical prescription. Id. n.9. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 429 F.2d 1398, 1401 (Ist Cir. 1970).
173. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). If one may privately possess and use
obscene matter that may have been obtained illegally, one should have the right to use
birth control devices that were obtained legally. If there is no reasonable, lawful manner
for such use the right to own is of no significance.
174. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
175. See Wexler, Sex Offenses Under the New Criminal Code, 61 ILL. B.J. 152-54 (1962).
176. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960).
177. A husband and wife who have separated, but for reasons of their own do not
obtain a divorce would be unable to establish meaningful relationships with other partners.
178. Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
179. See Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S.
989 (1971).
180. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
181. If single persons possess the same right of sexual privacy as married couples, they
too should be free to engage in acts of sodomy. See Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp.
729, 732-33 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
182. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972), quoting Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today,
that there is no more effective practical guarantee against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom
they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution
that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected.
Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be just than
to require that laws be equal in operation.
CONCLUSION

It has been approximately one hundred years since Florida first enacted
sodomy, adultery, and fornication statutes. These original proscriptions properly reflected that society's nineteenth century code of ethics and morals.
They do not reflect those of today's society. Sociological and psychological authorities have exposed the inadequacies of these sex prohibitions. The continued cohesion of jurisdictions whose criminal codes do not proscribe consensual, private sexual conduct between adults rebuts any fears that society
will degenerate in the absence of such laws. If individuals choose to go to the
devil, the "powerful checks of home, school, church and social evaluation
18 3
do not require as a supplement an unwieldy law enforcement apparatus."
Nor do these individuals need a legal escort on their journey to hell. Florida
must recognize that there no longer exists any justification for statutory
prohibition of sodomy, fornication, or adultery between consenting adults. As
"possessed" as those who engage in such conduct may be, America ceased
hanging witches in 1692.184
MORGAN STEvENsoN BRAGG

183. Note, Post-Kinsey: Voluntary Sex Relations as Criminal Offenses, 17 U. Cm. L. Rxv.
162, 182 (1949).
184. Witchcraft, or supposed intercourse with evil spirits, was punishable with death
until the statute was repealed in 1736. The only prosecution in America occurred in 1692,
as a result of which twenty persons were hanged in Salem, Massachusetts. BLAcK's LAW
DIaxONARY 1776 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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